

"It is not new in history that men and women have misunderstood each other's roles or envied each other, but the significant aspect of the American scene is that there is a discrepancy between the way we bring up boys and girls--each to choose both a job and a marriage partner--and then stylize housekeeping as a price the girl pays without stylizing the job as the price the boy pays. Men are trained to want a job in a mill, or a mine, on a farm, in an office, on a newspaper, or on a ship as a sign of their maleness, their success, and to want a wife and children to crown that success; but women today are not given the same clear career-line--to want an apartment, or a semi-detached house, or a farm-house, or a walk-up, or some other kind of home, as their job. The American woman wants a husband, yes, children, yes, a home of her own--yes indeed, it's intolerable to live with other people! But housekeeping--she isn't sure she wouldn't rather 'do something' after she gets married. A great proportion of men would like a different job--to have at least better pay, or higher status, or different working-conditions--but they are not asked to face the seeming discrepancy between being reared for a choice and reared to think that success matters, and also that love matters and that everyone should marry, and yet not be able to feel that the mate one chooses and the job one does after marriage are independent. It is as if a man were to make a set of plans for his life--to be an accountant, or a lawyer, or a pilot--and then have to add, 'Unless, of course, I marry.' 'Why?' you ask. 'Because then I'll have to be a farmer. It's better for the children, you know.'"

--Margaret Mead

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JOTTINGS FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

ENCOURAGING THE QUIET REVOLUTION: Government is inherently conservative, in the sense that it is invariably oriented toward maintaining the status quo. This remains essentially true regardless of whether the particular government under consideration is that of Falangist Spain or the People's Republic of China. This may be rather a startling concept, at first glance, but its accuracy is manifest. It is true that, e.g., the government of the People's Republic of China is composed of remarkably zealous revolutionaries, but the Communist Chinese nevertheless possess a conservative government in the sense that it does not actively promote domestic innovation. The revolutionary fervor of the Peking leaders does not extend to any particular desire for revolution or even evolution in China itself, except within the strict limits of Marxist "progress". Stated in these terms, the assertion that the government of the People's Republic of China is conservative is neither startling nor unusual; on the contrary, it would be most extraordinary if that (or any other) government were other than conservative with respect to its institutions and its attitude toward domestic innovation. A government naturally possesses a more than academic interest in preserving and strengthening the status quo, and this is equally if not especially true when the government in question is the creation of a revolutionary movement: once revolutionaries have rearranged the social, economic and political structure in conformity to their ideology, they are fiercely conservative in attempting to preserve the new status quo and suppress deviationary attitudes and practices.

This inherent conservatism of government is the cause, historically, of much of the friction between governments and discontented minorities (and therefore also between liberals and conservatives): the government is capable of accepting changes only gradually, whereas the minority with the grievance, being immediately and personally affected, is, quite naturally, disinclined to patience. This conflict between government and certain segments of the population has been a universal characteristic of human society, and it is usually a question in doubt right up until the very last moment whether or not the government can evolve rapidly enough to forestall revolution. Such conflict is probably an inescapable aspect of civilization, and the choice offered to every nation and every generation is not whether there will be conflict but rather how best to control the inevitable struggle in order to minimize the chances of violence erupting. Here in the United States of America, in the seventh decade of the Twentieth Century, I believe that an approach to this problem has developed which is unique in all of recorded history.

Here is a concept for the thoughtful to mull over, one which could easily be encountered in a politically-oriented science fiction novel: The Congress of the United States, acting at the behest of the Chief Executive and his staff, establishes and finances an organization which engages itself in training some of the most intelligent and ambitious young people in the country to actively

BY TED PAULS

oppose government at all levels where it acts contrary to their consciences and become integral members of a movement which is promoting a non-violent social revolution throughout the nation. On the face of it, this is a ridiculous concept. No government in the history of the world has ever actively encouraged any segment of its population to struggle against the status quo, in which the government itself possesses such a critical interest. The very idea of the United States government participating in such a venture is incredible, absurd, inconceivable; it is, in addition, one more thing: it is happening--today, at this very moment. The organization in question is called the Peace Corps, and although its primary purpose is to assist in the development of countries less fortunate than the United States, it secondarily but quite adequately fulfills the function described above. By the end of 1970, there will be 50,000 Peace Corps veterans in this country, exerting an influence entirely out of proportion to their numbers because, considering the qualifications demanded by the Peace Corps and the qualities which develop and flourish during the years of service, it is reasonable to assume that many will be community leaders. Approximately 50% of the Peace Corps veterans will be teachers. (This figure is based upon a study of the present 7500 "returnees", and assumes that the percentage entering education will remain reasonably constant as the size of the sampling increases.) As a result of their experience abroad, the vast majority of these veterans will be either active members or dedicated supporters of what has been termed the New Left. The ranks of the New Left will be additionally swelled by veterans of the domestic version of the Peace Corps, Volunteers In Service To America (VISTA), an organ of the Office of Economic Opportunity. In view of the character and experiences of these volunteers, it is not difficult to understand why this should be so.

The "average" Peace Corps or VISTA volunteer is as much a myth as the "average" man, but there are nevertheless certain characteristics identified with the field workers of these organizations. On the whole, they are young Americans of above average intelligence, who are ambitious, eager to accept challenge, deeply dedicated to the democratic principles of this nation, and possessed of a refreshing liking for people of all sorts. These qualities and attitudes are magnified in a special manner during their months or years of service in "underdeveloped" areas. Although the volunteer may learn a variety of skills during his residence in Africa, Latin America or Appalachia, the basic (and, for our purposes, important) education acquired during this period consists in the development or modification of attitudes in two broad areas. First, the volunteer learns to appreciate the essential brotherhood of man as an emotional and not merely an intellectual fact of life. Once you genuinely understand that human beings, regardless of their skin color; religion or economic level, are basically the same, with the same hopes, fears and desires, it is impossible to be indifferent to the plight of disadvantaged and/or oppressed minorities wherever they may be found. The Peace Corps volunteer, in addition, has this attitude burned into his mind on an even more direct level, because living amidst genuine belly-shriveling poverty in Northeast Brazil or the Sudan makes

the continued existence of Appalachias intolerable in an affluent society. Second, the volunteer, after experiencing at first hand the pervasive hopelessness and helplessness of poverty (whether absolute, as in Bolivia, or relative, as in Harlem), is likely to develop an intense appreciation of the value of direct action in compelling the government to take steps to alleviate these conditions. This is especially true of the Peace Corps volunteers, who serve abroad, and this aspect of the Peace Corps educational experience is difficult for many to grasp. The volunteers, many of them in their early twenties, occupy exalted positions in the areas in which they operate, often being personally responsible for massive projects. Obviously, the elegant young college girl from Boston who has shouted at a Brazilian Air Force general or a Liberian deputy minister for two hours in order to procure the loan of a helicopter is not likely to take "No!" for an answer from the Boston Public Welfare Department's third assistant deputy director of midnight inspections. The volunteers return to "normal" life possessing a keen appreciation of the value of direct action outside conventional channels; they are individuals who have learned from experience that the most effective method of getting something done is to organize masses of people and raise hell with every public official in sight.

One may agree that Peace Corps returnees and veterans of VISTA will in fact constitute a significant source of recruits for the radical organizations of the New Left, while continuing to doubt the further assertion that this result is a calculated purpose of the programs. In view of the fact that there is on record no previous instance of a government deliberately encouraging such protest, it may be asked whether it is not more reasonable to assume that the result described is an incidental and unplanned one. To answer my own rhetorical question, I believe it is reasonable to suppose that the people most closely connected with the Peace Corps; including its originators, its administrative head and the President, were and are completely aware of this secondary but highly significant effect of the organization and its domestic counterpart. Of course, this is not to say that the entire government is fully cognizant of this remarkable "side-effect" of these projects. As a matter of fact, I would seriously doubt that a majority of the members of Congress possess any clear understanding of this aspect of the function of the Peace Corps and VISTA. If an appropriations bill for the Peace Corps were sent to Congress bearing a Presidential message to the effect that the organization would not only aid underdeveloped countries and improve this country's image in the world, but also

(*****) "My name is Ronny. I am bold, courageous, benign, cheerful, patriotic, honorable; charitable, gay, romantic, handsome, witty, charming, lovable, moral, swashbuckling, loyal, humble, faithful, benevolent and brotherly."

"Not to mention unselfish, warmhearted, tolerant, considerate, merciful, generous, humane, pious, respectable, trustworthy, candid, scrupulous, noble, virtuous, manly, conscientious, straightforward, incorruptible and honest."

(*****) "I am a member of a fanatical, neo-Fascist political cult, overcome by a strange mixture of corrosive hatred and sickening fear, which is recklessly determined to capture the California statehouse in 1966."

encourage young Americans to engage in protest demonstrations, organize the poor and in general make life miserable for the urban political machines, I doubt that even President Johnson's wizardry would suffice to get it passed.

It is difficult to conceive, on the other hand, of the originators of the project, then-Senator Humphrey and the late President Kennedy, not thinking the matter through to its conclusion and realizing the domestic political consequences of the Peace Corps. As for President Johnson, encouraging individual citizens to utilize direct action techniques in order to achieve social justice seems exactly his cup of tea. Lyndon Johnson is a wily old populist and, overlooking for a moment his foreign policy (and wishing it were possible to overlook it for longer periods), he is by some considerable margin the most radical President this country has ever elected. The concept of a Peace Corps, functioning as I have described with regard to its veterans, would appeal to such a man. What is in any event absolutely certain is that Sargent Shriver, the head of the Peace Corps and the OEO, is completely aware of the subsidiary domestic function which his volunteers fulfill. Some months ago, a Life magazine article entitled "The Re-Entry Crisis" reported an incident which occurred when a Negro member of the Peace Corps headquarters staff, himself a former field volunteer, attempted to rent an apartment in Washington and was refused on account of his race. After registering a protest with the Council on Human Relations, about forty of the man's fellow workers, most of them also returnees, hastily printed signs ("Apartheid Apartment" "Peace Corps Volunteers Return to Bigotry") and left the office to picket the real estate firm. As they were leaving, however, they happened to encounter Mr. Shriver on the sidewalk and he, being curious, naturally asked to know what was going on. After hearing the story, the head of the Peace Corps and the Office of Economic Opportunity (that is, the man who runs, subject only to Congress and the President, both the regular and domestic versions of the Peace Corps) responded thusly: "Great! This is what the Peace Corps is all about, what we should stand for. Go to it!"

That conservatives have not strenuously objected to this situation is an indication, I believe, that the majority of them are not aware of it. Protest demonstrations almost invariably impel conservatives to react with horrified shrieks about "lawlessness" and "anarchy", so it is reasonable to assume that even the barest suspicion that the Johnson Administration is deliberately encouraging such activity would cause agonized wails of protest to emanate from the Right. Conservative intellectuals such as Kipp's own Publicola would probably point out that any institution of authority which encouraged resistance to its own decisions would be planting and nurturing the seeds of its destruction. As a matter of fact, this would ordinarily be a valid objection. After all, can anyone conceive of, e.g., a Communist government encouraging its youth to oppose its own decisions? It will be immediately recognized that this would merely constitute a protracted means of suicide for the government in question. Or suppose someone suggested that the Catholic Church actively promote opposition to its viewpoint within its own ranks? If this course were undertaken, the Church would in short order become a massive self-liquidating institution. However, these are merely ordinary situations; the situation which exists with respect to American democracy and direct action by individuals and groups against the government is most extraordinary. Democracy is essentially a quiet, continuing revolution, a revolution-through-evolution, as it were. What would be suicidal for an authoritarian government or other institution is not necessarily unhealthy for democracy. What distinguishes authoritarian, dogmatic ideologies is that to oppose specific aspects of policy on whatever ground is necessarily, from the viewpoint of the True Be-

lievers, to oppose the underlying concept. If you are a Catholic, e.g., though this is less true today than formerly, and oppose the Church position on a couple of issues, you are then considered a heretic. If you are a Communist and oppose certain practical aspects of Soviet Marxism-Leninism, then, too, you are a heretic, a member of an "anti-Party faction". Democracy, however, being neither authoritarian nor dogmatic, imposes no particular conformity with respect to policy issues, so the government of a functioning democracy can easily afford to encourage dissent or even active opposition on practical, everyday issues, without in the slightest endangering the concept of democracy. Between a demonstration against a particular government policy and a demonstration against the government itself--much less against the form of government--there is, in a democratic society, a qualitative distinction which most Communists and many rightists have never understood. One has only to recall, e.g., the naive attempt of the CPUSA to transform the Bonus March into a revolutionary spark. The presence of a protesting crowd in the nation's capital implied imminent revolution to doctrinaire Communists, who were ignorant of the unique relationship between government and citizenry which exists in a democracy.

As a matter of actual fact, the demonstrators of the New Left are, on the whole, better democrats than their progenitors, and the Peace Corps and VISTA volunteers are being taught to oppose, not democracy, but the failures of democracy, even when this requires resisting the authority of government on some level. Conservatives will probably never understand why this will not lead to all of the dire consequences which they predict on account of "a growing disrespect for law and order"; but then, I suppose, that is only natural, because conservatives have never really understood democracy itself.

"THE ECONOMICS OF THE COLOUR BAR", by Prof. W. H. Hutt (Andre Deutsch Ltd., 105 Great Russell St., London W.C.1, five shillings), a book dealing with the economic controls employed by the Nationalist government of the Republic of South Africa to suppress the black majority, was recommended to all Kipple readers by George Price in #86. George was kind enough to permit me to borrow this paperback, which I found to be both interesting and informative. Although I do not intend to formally review "The Economics of the Colour Bar" (that being Steve Barr's department), my perusal of the volume did suggest several comments and criticisms which I would like to take this opportunity to voice. Prof. Hutt is an extremely articulate observer of South African affairs and his analysis, while frequently tending to pedantry, is both authoritative and comprehensive. This book permits no doubt that the author is a sincere opponent of the appalling racial policies of the South African government, and his suggestions for ameliorating the situation are generally reasonable--as far as they go. Unfortunately, Prof. Hutt, betraying a deep-rooted bias for laissez faire economics and a terror of governmental authority characteristic of the conservative spokesmen of this era, evinces a tendency to espouse free enterprise as a panacea for problems which have essentially nothing to do with economics. In addition to this barrier to objective commentary, the author appears to be afflicted with the racial attitudes usually identified, in the United States, with the so-called "southern moderates". That is to say, his opposition to the racist policies implemented by his government appears to derive more from a moral conviction that tolerance is a duty required of the enlightened Christian than from an intellectual and emotional appreciation of the essential brotherhood of man. For example, in commenting on the plight of the Cape Coloureds (i.e., individuals of mixed European-African descent), Prof. Hutt remarks (page 15) that:

"It [the Coloured minority] constitutes the most unjustly treated, the most cheerful and the most lovable group of people I have ever known."

While this observation is probably well-intentioned, it would be interpreted by many Coloureds in a manner which would be acutely embarrassing to the author. One is reminded of the self-conscious comments of "white moderates" or the sort of self-proclaimed "liberals" exposed to ridicule and scorn by James Baldwin. Admittedly, this is a difficult concept for many to grasp, but it is every bit as much of an insult to fawn over an oppressed minority as "cheerful" and "lovable" as it is to condemn them as "lustful" and "lawless". The "lovable" Cape Coloured is a stereotype, like the shuffling southern Negro and the inebriated Irish foreman.

Although Prof. Hutt comments harshly on the motives and procedures of the South African government, he is also frequently guilty of carrying dispassionate analysis to extremes. He comments on the Pass Laws and their administration (pages 126-127):

"The general administration of these laws appears to have been harsh rather than precise. The rank and file of the police, who have the task of calling upon Africans to show their passes, have reflected the traditional Afrikaner outlook towards colour and have carried out their duties with crude severity, so that Africans have often been roughly addressed and even roughly handled by them. That is one reason why the Pass laws have engendered feelings of burning injustice and earned the enmity of Africans as a whole. Moreover, the prodigious number of charges brought under these laws seems to have encouraged many over-worked magistrates to deal out rugged rather than considered justice."

The author, of course, is a citizen of the Republic of South Africa, and even while vigorously disagreeing with the policies of his government he is restrained by patriotism from crossing the line between criticism and condemnation. It is necessary to remember, however, that we are dealing here with a police state in comparison to which the Mississippi Delta is Uncle Tom's version of heaven. The condition enforced upon the black majority in South Africa must be described as little short of de facto slavery. It is not conducive to providing the reader with a factual account of the situation to note, as if it were an unusual occurrence, that Africans have "even" been "roughly handled" by the police. And surely it is conspicuous pussy-footing to describe the treatment accorded to blacks by the judiciary by commenting that "over-worked magistrates" have meted out "rugged rather than considered justice".

These are comparatively minor criticisms, however. Prof. Hutt is more seriously vulnerable to attack when he permits his political prejudices to intrude. In discussing the position of the clergy in South Africa (page 40), he asserts that:

"...the Calvinist churches of South Africa have, as a result of history, become almost as completely subversive to a political party, the Nationalist Party, as the exponents of Marxism appear to be to the Communist parties behind the Iron Curtain."

It is a matter of demonstrable fact that even certain groups which pro-

claim themselves Communists are independent of effective control from behind the Iron Curtain. The designation "exponents of Marxism" includes, in addition to these factions, many Social Democrats and a variety of self-styled "Progressive" groups, which have been independent of the Communist bloc countries since at least the time of the Second International. So this blanket condemnation of Marxists offered by Prof. Hutt is not only gratuitous (since it had nothing whatever to do with the topic of discussion) but also erroneous.

On the next page, the good professor again manages to allude to the Communists in the course of what is ostensibly an examination of South African institutions:

"The Ruiterwag is a 'youth wing'. The Communist parallel is obvious."

The Nazi parallel, which Prof. Hutt conspicuously neglects to mention, is even more obvious. Indeed, it is remarkable to note that, despite the widespread similarities between the present Nationalist regime of South Africa and the government of Nazi Germany, the author never mentions Hitler or his minions in any manner or form.

On page 136, Prof. Hutt refers to "what some Americans are beginning to call the 'libertarian' tradition," and explains that this term is employed because "the socialists have taken to describing themselves as 'liberal'." The obvious implication of this statement is that persons who describe themselves as "liberals" are in fact socialists, at best a massive generalization. The author apparently assumes that "liberal" and "collectivist" have precisely identical meanings, and proceeds to argue that liberalism/collectivism cannot provide any useful solutions to the racial situation in South Africa. Discussing a particular piece of economic legislation, he observes (page 74):

"Much of the content of the Factories Act (of 1918) satisfied the 'liberal' criterion of serving the collective (as distinguished from the sectional) interest. But it was an example of discriminatory state intervention in so far as it conferred arbitrary power on the Minister of Labour to withdraw some exemptions from customs-duties on raw materials. Exemption could be withdrawn if, in the Minister's opinion, 'satisfactory labour conditions' were not being maintained; and factory inspectors under the Department of Labour made it clear that 'unsatisfactory' was interpreted to mean employment of non-whites when whites were available."

It is difficult to understand how liberals can be blamed (even assuming that the Factories Act was a measure which appealed to liberals) because a law is perverted by factory inspectors in order to serve the interests of a racist government. It is clear from this paragraph that the fault for the racial aspect of the Factories Act lies not with the law itself, providing for sanctions against employers who fail to provide "satisfactory labour conditions", but rather with the interpretation placed upon this by the Department of Labour. A few chapters later, Prof. Hutt advances to the notion that "collectivist" thinking not only is incapable of solving instances of "colour injustice", but is in fact directly responsible for them. On page 135, he asserts that:

"It is difficult to imagine a better illustration than is provided by South Africa of the truth that the fight against colour injustice is actually against the conse-

quences of planning on the collectivist model."

This is a conspicuous example of arguing from the particular to the general. It is certainly accurate to claim that the economy of the Republic of South Africa has been planned in such a manner as to deliberately perpetuate the economic and cultural backwardness of the Africans, but it is an altogether different matter to assert that colour injustice is a necessary or natural consequence of centralized economic planning. It is hardly surprising that economic planning intended to foster racial injustice will in fact have that result; but it is by no means demonstrated (or even suggested) by reason or experience that "planning on the collectivist model" will result in colour injustice when that is not its intention. It has been our experience in the United States that an increase in the authority of the national government (and consequently in "planning on the collectivist model") has significantly reduced racial injustice, in the economic as well as social and political spheres.

Not content with attributing "colour injustice" to the planned economy, Prof. Hutt also attempts to demonstrate (page 73) that such a situation is incompatible with the system of laissez faire:

"The lesson of history, explained by classical economic analysis, is that disinterested market pressures, under the profit-seeking inducement, provide the only objective, systematic discipline that would dissolve traditional barriers and offer opportunities irregardless of race or colour."

This paragraph, while formidable in appearance, is essentially meaningless, because "disinterested market pressures" are not, of course, permitted to function decisively in any region effected by racial injustice. What Prof. Hutt is saying here is that if bigots would permit the system to function as it ideally ought to function, there would be no racial injustice. But to the extent that this is true, it is equally true of any economic system: socialism, mercantilism, communism, even fascism would "offer opportunities irregardless of race or colour" if permitted to operate without the interference of racists. Even in this limited sense, however, Prof. Hutt's assertions about the free enterprise system are not entirely accurate; it does not constitute a panacea for racial injustice. It is quite possible for a group to be permitted complete freedom of the market and still be politically oppressed or socially ostracized.

Prof. Hutt's political prejudices are apparent when he speaks (page 107) in opposition to "the popular notion that the private exercise of coercive power (via strike or other action) constitutes one of the basic rights of man in a free society." He observes that:

"safeguards...against the exploitation of one set of employees by others, such as the managers against the rank and file.../ought to be/ embodied into non-discriminatory /regulations/ the breach of which can be challenged by appeal to the courts."

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"Happiness is the first minute on a new stick of chewing gum."

caption: Jack Speer

Earlier the good professor had asked:

"Is it not better to allow independent courts to interpret agreements and to ensure that they have been freely entered into? Is it not better to allow the determination of wage-rates and the conditions of work without recourse to the principle of 'might is right'?"

This dangerously approaches advocacy of the substitution of government edict for collective bargaining, but I suppose anything is possible from a commentator who dismisses strike action as "recourse to the principle of 'might is right'."

To complete this informal critique of "The Economics of the Colour Bar" as rapidly as possible, let me register a cavil regarding a couple of additional observations of the professor's, only peripherally connected with the points previously disputed. On page 126, for example, he remarks:

"One of the most curious aspects of the political situation in South Africa is the fact that a government which had passed an Act for the Suppression of Communism, aimed mainly at eradicating the activities of the Communist Party or Communist fellow-travellers among the Africans, has itself imposed a more or less authoritarian system on them."

This fact is neither curious nor surprising; it is, by this time, a veritable truism that the most enthusiastically anti-Communist regimes tend themselves to impose restrictions on freedom which are intolerable to any thinking citizen. If a government which promulgated an Act for the Suppression of Communism otherwise permitted a high degree of political liberty, that would be a curious circumstance.

Finally, Prof. Hutt, endeavoring to promote classic unrestrained capitalism, argues that its benefits were so imposing that it really is a shame that free enterprise has been shackled by the "collectivists". In arguing for this viewpoint, however, the author encounters historians who assert that laissez faire capitalism was something less than an unmixed blessing. So Prof. Hutt falls back on a favorite thesis of exponents of the free enterprise system (page 149):

"...the enormous improvements in the standards of living, health, security and equality of opportunity for the common people which were continuously engendered under the laissez-faire of the British Industrial Revolution produced unrest, discontent, occasional resort to strikes and violence, and opprobrium from superficial historians."

He cites no evidence to support the image of Benevolent Capitalism promoted by the Right; he merely asserts that historians who fail to agree with his rather odd outlook are "superficial".

The unwise reader, taking note of these jottings, will avoid purchasing "The Economics of the Colour Bar" as the result of my criticism; the wise reader will purchase the book (which contains much of value, despite the passages and attitudes to which I take exception) and read it well, but with a grain of salt.

--Ted Pauls

essays in conservatism

In the mid-1920's, following the death of Sun Yat-sen and the ascendancy of Chiang Kai-shek in the Kuomintang, Ch'en Tuh-siu, following the promptings of his Comintern mentors in Moscow, led the infant Chinese Communist Party into its fateful "united front" with the "national bourgeoisie". The fiasco which resulted from this attempt to infiltrate the Kuomintang was a turning point in Chinese history. For Chiang's "White Terror" taught the Chinese Communists the enormous importance in an agrarian country with a marginal industrial proletariat of mass peasant backing in the countryside. As a result, from this point on Chinese communism becomes a "mass"-oriented movement, as distinguished from the small band of intellectuals and conspirators who seized Petrograd in November of 1917.

Going into the rural areas, with the "rural revolution" the first item on the revolutionary agenda, Mao Tse-tung at the head of guerilla bands now sought to establish soviets in south-central China. In this period, Mao, Chu Teh and their comrades were largely out of touch with the "official" party leadership, under Li Li-san in Shanghai and the urban centers. The latter, however, being essentially in conformity with the "orthodox" faith in the industrial working class, objected to Mao's notion that the peasantry would "rescue" the workers. Conflict ensued as a result, which lasted until 1932-1933, when the leadership of Mao and Chu Teh was finally recognized and the Central Committee moved from Shanghai to the base of the new leadership.

Even in 1927, therefore, when Comintern-style orthodoxy was in vogue in China and Mao knew virtually nothing about classical Marxism, his first inclination was to view the masses of the Chinese peasantry as the most important revolutionary force in the country, the "anti-feudal vanguard" out of which the CCP would "emerge". Later, by 1930, when Mao had at last become more familiar with the world-view which Marx had formulated, he still maintained that although "proletarian leadership is the sole key to the victory of the revolution", widening the struggle in the countryside and developing the Red army would strategically react on urban developments. This was a view he would hold from then until the present.

The nature of Communism is such, however, that whatever strategy a party adopts on the basis of immediate tactical objectives must first be proven ideologically correct. Since Marxism is a world-view, the criterion of ideological correctness is the universal applicability of the ideology-action under consideration. It was this which led Lenin into his many exasperating attempts to apply Russian techniques to advanced countries and which eventually culminated in the frustration of "Left Wing Communism": similarly, Stalin's considerably more clumsy attempts at formulating Comintern strategy from 1924-1939 were consistently--to the delight of Trotsky--plagued by this dilemma. The classic examples, of course, were the disastrous alliance of the Chinese Communists with the Kuomintang and the failure of Stalin

to perceive the danger of National Socialism in Germany in the early thirties.

It is this need to ideologize strategy which contributes significantly to the alternative Chinese and Russian revolutionary "models". The Russians have consistently formulated strategy on the basis of "revolution from above", the Chinese on the basis of "revolution from below". The experiences of the war against Japan, the war against the Kuomintang, the "Long March" and the years in Yen-an have taught Mao the importance of the sheer weight of human masses. With "rifles and millet" the Chinese revolution was victorious, according to Chinese ideologues. The Kuomintang was well armed, yet "masses" overcame "technique", and the "weapons-mean-everything" theory was proven empirically wrong.

Just as the Red Army in China first consolidated its hold on the rural areas, Mao today maintains that the "countryside" of the world must first be conquered--i.e., Afro-Asia and Latin America. This done, the "cities" will inevitably fall. Although Communists must tactically beware the military might of the imperialists, strategically they must despise them, for the current of historical change is running in the direction of world revolution. Against this torrent, this "mighty torrent pounding...at the foundation of the rule of imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism", as Chou En-lai put it earlier this year, military sophistication is meaningless.

Being inseparably bound with the experience of the Chinese revolution, China's foreign policy reflects from all angles Maoist principles of guerilla war. What was good for China will be good for other colonial countries, and just as Mao declared in 1946 to Anna Louise Strong that "the atom bomb is a paper tiger...the outcome of war is decided by the people," so in 1960 Red Flag declared:

"Marxist-Leninists have always maintained that in world history, it is not technique but man, the masses of people, that determine the fate of mankind."

Since the acquisition by China of its own nuclear capacity, however, a decisive new element has entered into Chinese foreign policy formulation. Although one cannot yet say, as the Chinese have of the Russians, that Peking has forgotten "that the masses are the makers of history", or that "they have degenerated into worshippers of nuclear weapons", recent signs ominously suggest that Chinese flippancy towards nuclear weapons might be about to inject a new and dangerous element of instability into what President Kennedy called the precarious balance of terror which stays the hand of mankind's final war. The Chinese have repeatedly claimed that they desire total disarmament, yet the Russians answered this aptly, recognizing the ulterior motives behind such statements, in August of 1963:

"Even if the Chinese government makes, not two but one hundred and two statements that it is dying to achieve the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and that its only concern is the interests of the peoples, it will not be able to wash off the shame of gambling on the death of hundreds of millions of people...in a thermonuclear war."

China has consistently, since July of 1963, adhered to its view stated at that time that the partial test ban treaty was a "dirty fraud", by which the current nuclear powers conspired "to consolidate their nuclear monopoly and bind the hands of all the peace-loving countries sub-

jected to the nuclear threat", and by which the imperialists gain everything, yet lose nothing. In short, the Chinese have adopted a thoroughly negative attitude toward any attempt to prevent the proliferation of countries having in their possession nuclear weapons. Peking has apparently realized that, despite its own "paper tiger" thesis, possession of "the bomb" is an exceptional trump card in international politics. Though the "mighty torrent" might already be pounding, nuclear weapons can give it an enormous impetus, and this is a fact which Peking strategists have been quick to notice.

The fruit of this realization may already be developing. Last February 2, the official Antara News Agency in Djakarta, Indonesia, reporting a speech by Brigadier General Hartono, director of Indonesia's military arsenal, revealed for the first time President Sukarno's ambition to make Indonesia the world's sixth nuclear power. Promising a "big surprise" at the forthcoming armed forces day ceremonies in October, General Hartono declared that nearly 200 scientists were working to produce the country's first atomic bomb. In addition, plans were also being made for the production of Indonesian ICBMs and the construction of the country's first explosives factory.

Although the major part of the Western press gave scant attention to these reports at the time, probably taking into consideration previous Indonesian verbosity, recent indications are of such a nature as to warrant second thoughts on the matter. Apparently the prospects of access to this greatest "toy" ever have not been forgotten by Indonesia's bellicose President. At a Moslem conference on July 24 in Bandung, Sukarno once more reiterated his country's intention of developing the bomb, adding at that time that it would be used for "defense only".

Shortly thereafter, on July 27, at the slapstick Eleventh World Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo)--a Japanese Communist Party affair held under the tutelage of Peking--Sukarno again broached the subject of an atomic bomb for Indonesia. In a message read to the conference he is reported to have said:

"Nuclear weapons in the hands of the new emerging forces are weapons in the defense of freedom, while in the hands of imperialists they are weapons for war and oppression."

HOME FROM CAMP: 1945

(#####)
(0 0) "My name is Michael. I am eight years old. I have just
(U) returned from three weeks at camp. We did all sorts of
(()) things in our camp, and I enjoyed myself very much. Our
camp was very big."

"I was one of the kids who volunteered to help the coun-
sellors. They gave us uniforms and we did many things. We
even had a special name."

(#####)
(0 0)
(U)
(())

(#####)
(0 0) "They called us 'Sonderkommandos'.
(U)
(())

Carefully indicating that this was a conference designed to ban only some of the bombs, Sukarno declared in the same address that "all freedom- and peace-loving peoples of the world...(should) improve their armaments, even including nuclear weapons."

At the same time, Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai once more stressed his government's opposition to any steps taken to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This, interestingly enough, took place on the same day as the Seventeen-Nation Geneva Conference was re-convened in Geneva. Chou's comments, however, were no surprise, for as early as August, 1963, in a passage from which Sukarno might have borrowed his own statement, the Chinese declared that:

"Nuclear weapons in the possession of a socialist country are always a means of defense against nuclear blackmail and nuclear war. So long as the imperialists refuse to ban nuclear weapons, the greater the number of socialist countries possessing them, the better the guarantee of world peace. A fierce class struggle is now going on in the world. In this struggle, the greater the strength on our side the better. Does it make sense to say the less the better?"

Reports of late now appear to suggest that the fraternal comrades of Peking, in their self-appointed role of pater familias in relation to Sukarno's "new emerging forces", might quite possibly be effecting a dangerous compliance with the Marxist shibboleth of the "unity of theory and practice". Of some importance in this regard might be the declaration of Wu Heng, vice-chairman of the Chinese Scientific and Technological Commission on March 17, 1965, the occasion of signing a Chinese-Indonesian scientific cooperation agreement. At the ceremony attending the signing, he emphasized that the treaty marked a "new stage" in cooperation between the two countries. Significantly, on the previous day, D. N. Aidit, leader of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), suggested that the consequences of the agreement would be to "smash Western domination in the scientific and technical fields".

Again, on July 27, the day of Sukarno's remarks in Tokyo, the director general of the Indonesian Army logistics department reported that his country would test a nuclear device in November--though perhaps the date has been moved ahead for the "big surprise" to which Hartono referred--following the re-scheduled Afro-Asian conference.

At present, however, Indonesia has only one operative nuclear reactor, supplied by the United States and located in Bandung. Work is additionally in progress on a second, with Soviet aid, at Serpong. Neither of these, though, is capable of producing the fissionable material required for an atomic bomb. This would suggest, therefore, one of two possibilities: either fissionable material is being supplied to Indonesia by a nuclear power or, alternatively, a completed nuclear device has been supplied to Sukarno. The only "nuclear power" which might be willing to supply Indonesia with a bomb is China.

What might quite conceivably be developing, therefore, is a qualitative change in the Peking-Djakarta axis, indeed in China's foreign policy as such. One need only speculate momentarily on the results of such an explosion, if it is being prepared in the manner we have suggested, to recognize the enormous opportunity it would provide China for wreaking havoc throughout the underdeveloped world in general and Southeast Asia in particular.

Japan, for example, could scarcely be elated over such a development, not to mention the precarious Malaysian Federation which Sukarno's policy of "confrontation" is designed to "crush". Indian fears of

Chinese aggression would understandably multiply. Yet if India were to respond by developing its own nuclear arsenal what would be the alternative in the present circumstances for Pakistan? And what of Australia, or Formosa? Moreover, the already distraught Southeast Asian region, including the Phillipines, would suddenly find itself within the grip of a Peking-Djakarta nuclear axis.

In addition, such an explosion might suggest that the bomb could be made available to other underdeveloped countries without their undergoing the tremendous expenses involved in development--this would be a temptation too great to resist.

At present, of course, it is fitting to remind the reader that all of what we have been saying is, to date at least, speculation. Should events materialize in the manner we have suggested, however, as indications seem to render plausible, what we will be witnessing is a flip-pant, irresponsible, and enormously dangerous novelty in Chinese policy. Not only would we then be able to expect continued so-called "wars of national liberation" such as we are presently dealing with in Vietnam, but in addition the entire world would be confronted with a flagrant violation of both common sense and reason. The "guerilla warfare" element in Chinese foreign policy today remains a vital one, so vital that the Chinese continue to scoff at the prospects of nuclear war and cling to their theory that should such a disaster be brought about imperialism "will be razed to the ground and the whole world will become socialist." Subsequently, so the story goes, "on the debris of a dead imperialism, the victorious people would create very swiftly a civilization thousands of times higher" than that existing under capitalism.

In light of these attitudes, it becomes a highly difficult question whether Chinese-sponsored proliferation of nuclear weaponry is a prospect which the West could contemplate with equanimity. Already there have been reasoned suggestions put forward in favor of a preventive strike against Chinese nuclear and industrial capacity. Doubtless these, in the event of such a decisive turn in the aggressive stance of the Chinese government, would mount in both frequency and intensity. The wisdom of such a course, however, is another matter, with which we shall not deal here, except to point out that we personally, quite naturally, would give scant sympathy to any suggestion of "non-violence" interpreted in the New Left sense. Besides, one cannot help but reflect upon the supreme irony if a preventive attack were to transpire; how great would the opportunity then be to "construct a glorious civilization" etc., etc., etc.

--Publicola

"French officials now have an excellent knowledge of what is going on in the minds of the North Vietnamese leaders, who are said to be much closer to Moscow than they were even a few months ago, and who are increasingly irritated by Peking's uncompromising attitude. The reason is simple: lately Soviet aid to North Vietnam has been arriving in serious quantities; not only military aid but also economic. If there is at present no acute starvation in North Vietnam, though shortages are very grave, it is due to Russia. China still gives very little. In addition, the leaders in Hanoi look with mounting concern on the destruction of their country by US air raids. One is told in Paris that most Hanoi leaders now fully accept Moscow's opinion, expressed only in private, that they have everything to gain and nothing to lose from negotiations and a peaceful settlement. But neither Moscow nor Hanoi is yet willing to make the slightest move in that direction, if there is the slightest risk that Peking will denounce it as a 'surrender to American imperialists'." --Philip Ben, in the New Republic.

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As I read the letters written by various readers of Kip-ple, I sometimes feel discouraged, not at the many liberal opinions (for in these times, and in this part of the country, one almost becomes inured to them), but by the misconceptions carried by conservatives. For example, in issue #82, George Price speaks about when "the Communists have abandoned their aggressive intentions" and that we risk fighting them "after the necessity has passed". A Communist without aggressive intentions is like a triangle with four sides. It is impossible even to imagine such a thing. Since long before they took power in Russia, the Communists have followed the same policies that they do today--murder, confiscation; atheism, terrorism and conspiracy.

Still, Mr. Price is correct in opposing Communism without regard to how the Communist government in question came to power. If too many illiterate or otherwise unqualified people are per-

mitted to vote, any party which promises them enough is capable of being elected. I shudder to

DISSENTING OPINIONS

think what consequences may result from the federal government's present drive to register illiterates. These "registrars" in the South are now under specific orders to register illiterates. What kind of government might be elected by these people can already be seen in Mississippi where, in the expectation of getting the franchise, a Communist-dominated group called the "Freedom Democratic Party" is now signing up these ignorant potential voters. (In view of the fact that the "qualified" (i.e., white) voters of Mississippi elected Ross Barnett and Paul Johnson in succession, it is difficult to see how the addition of a few (more) illiterates to the voting lists could have a deleterious effect. The Federal Government is not, of course, engaged in a "drive to register illiterates"; the purpose of the drive is to register Negroes, and, due to the fact that many southern communities employ "literacy tests" as a means of restricting the franchise to

whites, the registration of some illiterates is an incidental and minor consequence. Has it occurred to you, incidentally, that an increase in the number of ignorant people on the voting rolls should be a posi-

LETTERS

tive boon to your political faction? Perhaps in 1968, if several million ignorant citizens are registered in the meantime, you can carry seven or eight states... As to your assertion concerning the MFDP, I trust you realize that it could be held libellous; what evidence do you propose to introduce in support of this accusation?)

Mr. Price's request to me of "what Negroes are like" is, I think, adequately answered by the recent riots in Los Angeles. Actually, these white liberals who pretend to be the friend of the "downtrodden" Negro are his worst enemy. They have raised his expectations beyond anything he may reasonably expect to get. They have told him that he can hope for executive and technical jobs which are far beyond the mental capacities of almost all his race. Then, when these expectations are not realized, Negroes feel frustrated, and their frustration erupts in rioting. The Ne-

gro should try, and be taught to try, to be a better Negro. If he is told to compete with white men, no good is done to either race.

Yet, to reply to your question to me in issue #84, though there are riots, murders, rapes and thefts in the Harlems of our nation, there is one kind of crime you will never find there. I have never heard of a rally in favor of the Viet Cong being held in Harlem, or in any other poor district of either race. These pro-Communist demonstrations occur on campuses where white Americans with all the advantages in the world are studying. So Communism can scarcely be said to be a movement of the poor.

To return to my earlier argument, I am presently in contact with another conservative, whom I met through the National Fantasy Fan Federation's newsletter. From her correspondence, she seems to be a pious, patriotic and intelligent woman. Yet she is so pessimistic about the future of America and the capitalist economic system that she seems resigned to giving in to some form of Socialism, and merely hopes that it will not be too harsh. I can understand how she might feel this way, but there is no need for so bleak an outlook. There are still millions of Americans who will vote against such a thing if the right candidate appears, and who will fight against it if necessary.

Derek Nelson and L. Sprague de Camp make sensible defenses of capital punishment, and there is little I feel I can add to their views. I am so disgusted at the way criminals are turned loose in this city that I scarcely want to dwell upon the matter. Capital punishment has been almost completely abolished in New York state, just when crime rates are rising.

Yes, I agree with you that Adlai E. Stevenson was "a true citizen of the world". It's too bad he couldn't have behaved sometimes like a citizen of the United States of America.

I find the differences between the "New Left" and the "Old Left" as uninteresting and unimportant as the "Sino-Soviet Split". If there is a difference at all between the two factions, it is only a matter of tactics and not of ends. I should resent your off-hand description of the John Birch Society as a "subversive faction", but I doubt that this would do any good.

It was not "enterprising American opponents of evolution" who showed that evolutionism and Communism had a common origin, it was the Communists themselves. Almost as soon as Darwin published his works, they were seized upon and propagated by Communists as examples of their own theories. I believe that Friedrich Engels once wrote something about "the role played by labor in the transistion from ape to man". I am surprised that you seem to be so well-read in the Communists' classics as you are, yet neglected this. (I am surprised that you neglected to mention the fact that Marx offered to dedicate "Das Kapital" to Charles Darwin (who politely declined); this is precisely as relevant to the question of a connection between evolution and Communism as the statement you quote from Engels. This paragraph represents an excellent illustration of the Anti-Communist Syndrome, according to which the fact that several or many Communists favor a particular theory or program is parlayed into the conclusion that the theory or program in question is somehow tainted. Marx and Engels accepted Darwin's theories on evolution; ergo, according to this reasoning, evolution is communistic. The Daily Worker editorializes in favor of police review boards; ergo, police review boards are a Communist plot. Apart from being utterly absurd, this sort of "reasoning" is extremely unwise; Communists have a habit of attempting to identify themselves with popular and respectable ideas, with the result that any person who sets out to arrange his opinions on the basis of opposing what Communists (claim to) favor is bound to end up

sounding like a jackass.))

To judge from the influence already possessed by Communism on college campuses, Councilman Williams' proposal seems like locking the barn door after the horse is stolen. Don't you care to what influences these impressionable and immature students are exposed? Or should Catonsville become like the University of Havana before Castro's takeover, the nursery for revolutionaries? One Berkeley in a country is more than enough. (There is little likelihood of a worthwhile discussion concerning the extent of Communist influence on college campuses unless all of the participants can agree upon a definition of terms. You appear to attribute to the malignant influence of Communist agents any attitude or opinion to the left of your own extreme reactionary viewpoint. For my part, I do not care to flatter the Communists by giving them credit for the widespread campus advocacy of integration, freedom of speech and press, the United Nations, and other causes supported by all but a sick minority of American citizens. I wonder, if the Young Americans for Freedom were the dominant political group on the majority of American campuses, would you continue to insist that college students were "impressionable and immature"? To respond to your implied question, I am in favor of Communist speakers addressing college students in this country. There are two principal arguments for this position. First, the American ideal of freedom of speech and its corollary freedom to hear every viewpoint demands that no restrictions be imposed for political reasons on campus lecturers. Second, a speech by a doctrinaire Communist constitutes the most effective propaganda against Communism; I would be delighted, as an opponent of Communism, if more American college students were exposed to the incredible drivel spouted by Communist hacks (just as I would be delighted, as a liberal, to publish nine pages of your opinions every issue...)).

There is an interesting connection between the Nuremburg trials and today's "civil disobedience" movement. The defenders of both seem to believe that, without regard to the laws of his country, each individual should do as seems best to him. The laws of Nazi Germany were, of course, evil laws. But the precedent established in punishing people for not disobeying them is a very troublesome one. It is a precedent appealed to by every beatnik who burns his draft card or cheers for the Viet Cong or raises trouble in Alabama. We have in this country a means for agreeing on what ought or ought not to be legal. Bad laws may be enacted under this legislative system, but they are still better than the anarchy and civil strife that result from letting each man decide for himself what is legal or illegal. (The activists who burn draft cards, oppose U.S. policy in Vietnam and "raise trouble" in Alabama (I assume you mean stirrin' up the Nigras) are not, as I have taken pains to point out before, "beatniks"; beatniks are, by definition, passive, with no interest in social or political issues.))

"The larger the island of knowledge, the longer the shore line of wonder." --Ralph Sockman, in "Now to Live!"

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Like everyone else, I am very much concerned about Vietnam these days, and I agree with the opinions Duncan McFarland expressed in Kip-ple #85. Past wars that the United States has engaged in have always had a sufficiently ennobling motivation, like the desire to maintain our way of life. But there is nothing ennobling about the intervention in Vietnam, and this country has no business being there. I don't think Vietnam is worth American tax money or American lives. The South Vietnamese

do not want us there, and they are not to be trusted. In the day, they are our friends; at night, they teach the lessons we taught them to the North Vietnamese. We have to train one group to counterattack the group which we previously trained. We cannot win this war because there is nothing to win. So the answer is to clear out of it as fast as we can, by any means. The clearest way to do this is any past war would have been just to throw a big bomb on the enemy. If this measure would prove to be the most economical so far as human lives are concerned, then I would say this is what we ought to do. But since this action would surely send Peking bombing back at us, then we've got to do the other thing. Pull out without delay. There's nothing there to interest us. (I hate to be the agent of your disillusionment, but past wars in which the United States has engaged have decidedly not "always had a sufficiently ennobling motivation". I suggest that you examine the history of the Mexican War and the Spanish-American War.))

Capital punishment does not help cut murder rates, because murder is rarely a premeditated thing. Murders are committed in fits of anger. Often they originate in drunken brawls, and no one stops to think what the consequences will be. I don't think any state can cut its murder rates by punitive means. But I do think all crime rates, including murder, can be reduced by improving the living standards. So far as the death penalty goes, I think it is inhumane. It means slaughtering a person just like you would slaughter an animal. Even this state acknowledged some recognition of this inhumanity when they replaced the gallows with the gas chamber. This modification was made after a fellow had been poorly scaffolded, and had dangled squirming for several minutes in mid-air. One of the worst inhumanities of capital punishment is having a man placed on the death roll to await the end of his life. The last meal, the final visit by the chaplain, all of these things must equal the pains felt at the end.

While I'm on the subject of police and laws, I can't help wondering if anyone else feels that the police are being especially brutal to some of the young people who engage in peaceable civil rights or pacifist demonstrations. Anyone disrupting the peace ought to be locked up, but if the demonstrators are peaceful, as they usually are, the police should keep their hands off.

"It is an immense advantage to have done nothing, but one should not abuse it." --Comte de Rivarol.

JACK SPEER :: 2034 KIVA :: SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

Kipple #83: Some offhand thoughts on De Camp's letter first. You caught him well on the point "right and wrong are precisely what the legislatures say they are", but otherwise the letter is good, and generally sound.

Perhaps, however, deterrence doesn't work with crimes of passion as well as it does with crimes against property, etc. And the necessity of punishment isn't the necessity of capital punishment. (Actually, the lapse in logic there is on the part of the opponents of capital punishment; their arguments frequently would go as well to prove that any punishment does no good, yet they don't generally take the responsibility for that position.) (My position is that, in general, punishment is not a particularly effective deterrent to crime, and I am opposed to the viewpoint which conceives the purpose of the courts and the penal system to be the imposition of retributive suffering on criminals. Certainly criminals must be confined; but, once they have been removed from contact with society at large and placed in a controlled environment,

the goal should be to cure, not punish.))

Since really competent psychologists or psychiatrists are scarce, you ought to face the question whether such skills are best employed on the human wreckage of a penitentiary, or on more hopeful material. Incidentally, your parentheis on the third page of this letter seems to overlook the fact--I think it's a fact--that released criminals are more likely than is the average person to commit further crimes. And the image of the "frightened and fleeing" burglar doesn't conjure up for me quite the feeling of sympathy you aim at. Frightened and fleeing he may be at the moment; but in a few days he'll be swaggering among his delinquent friends again, sneering at square morality and planning another burglary.

George Price: In the mere possibility of the city taking over, there is a powerful tacit control on the private water company's taking full advantage of its monopoly. It is this, as much as the competition of public utility districts, that has kept the price of privately generated electricity down in Washington and Oregon. In Price's world, of course, a government takeover would be unthinkable, and thus the possibility would be no check on private monopoly.

Re your editorial on Vietnam: Implicit in the whole article--the references to "one country", the attempted analogy with our Civil War--is an assumption that I didn't find warranted in some superficial reading that the article prompted me to do. I found little historical basis for speaking of Vietnam as a single country. French Indo-China consisted of four kingdoms, Tonkin, Laos, Annam and Cambodia, and the colony of Cochin-China, which had once been an independent kingdom but was overrun by the Annamese. Apparently Tonkin was also at one time ruled by the Annamese, though I gathered that the Tonks considered themselves a

("""") "Folks, would you please give me your attention for a moment, I have an announcement to make. Please, quiet down
(¯ ¯) and take your seats, this will only take a minute. Hey,
(w) you in the back; sit down and stop talking, will you?"
((◊))

"Charlie? Hey, Charlie! Listen, fella, you can make love to your girlfriend some other time, but right now will you please get the hell back to your chair... Dave, shut that goddamn radio off and pay attention!"

("""")
(¯ ¯)
(w)
((◊))

("""") "Anne, what are you doing? Well, we're all choked up about that. Now put your brassiere back on and sit the hell down! George, will you please come in off the ledge and close the window..."

"Phil, if you don't put that pea-shooter away in five seconds, I'm gonna ram it down your throat sideways... Okay, that's better. Now (ahem)...here is an announcement of interest and importance."

("""")
(¯ ¯)
(w)
((◊))

("""") "At 10:30 A.M., EDT, on September 4, 1965, Deirdre Boardman (9 pounds, 9 ounces) was born to John and Perdita Boardman. John reports that mother and daughter are doing well, father slowly recovering, big sister overjoyed."

("""")
(¯ ¯)
(w)
((◊))

separate people. When the Japanese seized control of the country in early 1945, Cambodia and Annam declared independence and fought against the Japanese, and to some extent against the returning Europeans. France granted Cambodia's autonomy in 1946, and about the same time, the north-south division of the country first occurred. I'd think you have to go back pretty far in history to find any justification for the "one country" idea as applied to Tonkin-Annam-Cochin, and that not a very strong justification.

A couple of questions, showing my great ignorance: Why were two years to intervene before the carrying out of the Geneva Agreement, during which only the north was self-governing? What means were provided in the Geneva Agreement, or any subsequent proposals, for safeguarding freedom of the elections? This is a serious matter, because of the one-way characteristic of totalitarian rule. If the United States were asked to hold elections jointly with a neighboring country of equal population and abide by the result, we would be justifiably disturbed if that country were governed by a one-party government which could be expected to turn out the usual nearly unanimous vote for its slate that such states customarily produce. I have heard that a similar prospect is one reason that West Germany refuses to negotiate with East Germany on the subject of reunion, although the west is far more populous than the east, and the regime in the east immeasurably more unpopular than the North Vietnamese regime with its people. For such an election to be held on anything like fair terms, there should be a considerable degree of freedom enforced in both parts by some outside power, at least long enough for a good campaign, perhaps much longer. There should also be guarantees that if the anti-Communists lost, they would not be liquidated or forced into exile; otherwise, such a threat would exercise a strong inhibiting influence on them, to which there would not be a corresponding inhibition on the Communists. (The two year period intervening between the cessation of hostilities and the holding of elections to reunify the country was a concession won by the French, who were convinced that the Viet Minh would easily win the elections and wished time to liquidate their facilities and evacuate their personnel in an orderly fashion. During this period, Vietnam north of the partition line was governed by a provisional regime headed by Ho Chi Minh, while south of the partition line a provisional government under the Emperor Bao Dai (and his Prime Minister, Ngo Dinh Diem) reigned. For all practical purposes, of course, the Bao Dai government was a puppet of the French colonial authority. According to the Geneva Agreement, the provisional governments were to be replaced in 1956 by a national government chosen in free elections, which were to be supervised by the International Control Commission.)

Whatever the rights and wrongs of the Geneva Agreement and Ngo's refusal to abide by it, the situation now is that the country is divided. Such a de facto situation may be more important in considering some moral questions than what ought to have been. For example, Berlin ought to be united; nevertheless, if one part of it were to support an insurrection in the other part, the way North Vietnam is supporting the Viet Cong, this would properly be considered external aggression. Similarly if we were to support an uprising in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, although we have never recognized the Soviet Union's annexation of those states.

One other minor point I see in my marginal notes: You say no Vietnamese Communist or nationalist can accept the "permanent existence of one section of the country as the virtual satellite of...the United States". Aside from the dubious designation "the country", you overlook the probability that if the civil war ended, the United States would no longer be so overwhelmingly present.

The New Left: I'm a little puzzled by the reference here to "a steady leftward movement of the entire country during the thirty years", and a similar remark in a more recent Kipple. I doubt that we are any further left now than we were in 1935. Certainly not in sentiments. Much liberal legislation has been passed in the interim, and become institutionalized; but from the viewpoint of political activity, the history of those three decades has been a movement from left to right and back again, like a Greek chorus. (My assertion that there has been a "steady leftward movement of the entire country" over the past three decades and your statement that "the history of those decades has been a movement from left to right and back again, like a Greek chorus" are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The political sentiments of a population can undergo extreme fluctuations from one year to the next, like the line on a graph showing the annual rainfall in Southern Europe, while at the same time revealing a long-term trend in one particular direction. Thirty years ago, the Social Security program came into existence amid screams of protest over this "step toward socialism"; a few weeks ago, the passage of rent subsidy legislation caused barely a ripple. To me, this indicates that we have moved considerably to the left in three decades (though my use of the word "steady" was probably ill-advised).)

I enjoyed your description of the New Left, which tallies pretty well with what I've seen. However, in the course of it, the question occurred to me--why do you think the New Left is so important? Sure, one should keep up generally with beatniks, rock&roll fans, and various other things that people do; but what reason is there to think that the New Left, with its nihilism, is going to accomplish anything worth remembering? In a later Kipple, I believe you spoke of the possibility that they might smash everything if they decided it wasn't worth preserving. I can't see them doing anything so massive, either positively or negatively. Incidentally, have you happened to see the comic in the September Esquire on this subject? (The New Left has already accomplished something worth remembering: five years of unparalleled progress in the civil rights movement. The new radicals are hardly comparable to the beatniks or the rock&roll enthusiasts; they are spearheading a quiet social revolution, which is intimately connected with the sexual revolution, the revival of folk-music, and other phenomena of this most extraordinary decade.)

Kipple #84: Many thoughtful people would say you're being naive in putting political democracy first. Even with what I consider the necessary accompaniments--free speech, freedom from arbitrary arrest, etc.--political democracy may be a pretty fragile flower if there is at the same time great inequality among the people, many on the edge of starvation, others rich enough to buy a thousand votes and a hundred goons apiece; if nine-tenths of them are illiterate and lack means of communication such as roads and radio; if there is no capable civil service, and the government has such a history of incompetence and corruption that everyone despairs of it; if the people are dominated by warlords, private gangs, clan feuds, or priests; if the people are deeply divided into racial or religious factions; and so on. It's true that reforms resting on the good will of those temporarily in power are less certain to last than reforms resting on responsibility to the voters; but you can't have everything; and sometimes it's better to work for improving the lot of the people, than to insist on immediate democracy. Caesar just crossed my mind (doubtless a more taxing journey than his crossing of the Rubicon), but the obvious examples are in Africa today.

Re Price's statement that the guilty Nazi officials could and should have been tried and executed under the civil laws of Germany--didn't the Allies try that approach after World War I?

Laissez-faire doesn't necessarily eliminate the submarginal pro-

ducers. It eliminates those who haven't enough money to hang on through some bad seasons, price-wise or weather-wise. The "number of farmers would decline and so would crop production" isn't what happens. The land is there and has to be farmed if someone's investment in it (maybe at sheriff's sale) isn't to be lost. But it's worked by hired hands who move from place to place instead of a man who lives on it and thinks of it as his.

Why shouldn't Price be allowed to buy gold on the open market the same as base metals? Well, one obvious reason is that it's not the same kind of commodity. People buy base metals to consume in production. People buy gold with the idea of speculating on a change in the relationship between gold and other things. Such a change in the relationship is the only way a speculator can hope to make a profit. And if a speculator can do anything--as Fiske and Gould could on Black Friday--to augment a favorable fluctuation, they'll do so. Do we want to encourage manipulation of gold to produce fluctuations? Currency fractionally backs the accounts in banks, and lack of confidence in the banks causes hoarding of currency, causing runs on the banks, most strikingly illustrated in the collapse of the country's banking system at the end of Hoover's administration. Currency, in turn, is fractionally backed by gold. Do we want to set up a situation where the same kind of thing can happen in regard to the currency? Since the supply of gold hasn't increased as the world's need for a medium of exchange has grown, the relation between gold and moneys-and-credits is more delicate today than it used to be--or would be delicate if gold were again available for private hoarding.

Let me finish off #84 with a comment on your discussion with Harry Warner on college kids staying out of politics. While one may bring in various other kinds of arguments, I think his attitude toward political activity by collegians is determined by whether he likes or doesn't like the particular kind of politics they're espousing. As long as the most noticeable ones are in the liberal or radical ranks, conservatives (and I'm afraid Harry is becoming one) will think it better to hold them back until they get tangled up in meeting mortgage payments, raising kids, and so on. If there get to be too many of them worshipping at the shrine of Ayn Rand, some of us liberal fogies are going to start wishing they'd wait until they have some contact with the realities of finding a job, bargaining with their employers, and maybe experience a recession firsthand.

"It is regrettable that, among the Rights of Man, the right of contradicting oneself has been forgotten." --Baudelaire.

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Say, did you know that because the U.S. mint in Philadelphia began last week to stamp out copper-nickel quarters instead of silver ones the whole country is on the road to ruin and destruction? 'Struth! I read it tonight in the Albuquerque Tribune. One Richard Starnes, a columnist of sorts, it seems, tells me that we will soon have starved urchins peddling their sixteen-year-old sisters on the streets, bad hotels, worse food, and 50,000 people killed on the highways. In addition, television will become more witless, politicians will dissemble, and the Negroes are going to riot (well, they'd probably do that anyway). Not to mention that lifeguards dye their hair blond, students don't study, teachers don't teach and parents don't pare. But beatniks--wretched ones at that--march in endless protest, and we will--shudder--have a national lottery within ten years. And all, I tell you, all because the

Fascinating, the things one reads in the newspapers. Of course, the solution to the whole problem, in my opinion, is for the Philadelphia mint to stop minting these token-type quarters. Right? Right! Re-open the San Francisco mint and mint them there; no reason at all why Philadelphia should get this sort of work.

And so we are. It's a stupid war that we have no business at all being mixed up in. LBJ hasn't asked my advice, but in the unlikely event he should I have an answer: "I'd sure get the hell out of there if I was you, Jack." (A year's subscription to Dynatron to anyone who can name the source of that quotation.) I'm in full agreement that a national election, supervised by disinterested parties, should be held in Vietnam and that everyone should abide by the results.

Now you can, undoubtedly, find much fault with that last paragraph and I'm not about to argue it with you. Just consider that you are Private T. Pauls assigned to a combat unit in Vietnam and that somebody has just taken a shot at you. Mull it over a bit.

[illegible]

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